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to recognize that economists have developed a
formal theory of monetary policy over the past
60 years or so and that this theory really does
guide our thinking. The theory has two logical
parts. The first is a clear set of objectives. The
second is a specification of how policy, in pursuit
of these objectives, affects the economy.
The model of how the economy works is
complicated, and I could not possibly begin to
present it here. But I will say that our understand-
ing of how the economy works is based on eco-
nomic theory and an enormous body of empirical
research that tests the theory. Our understanding
is often qualitative, and we know that we must
attach standard errors to our numerical predic-
tions. An active research program within the
Federal Reserve and by academic and business
economists continuously refines the theory and
our empirical understanding.
Let me use an analogy: Hurricane forecasting
has come a long way, but, as anyone who watches
the weather news knows, the forecasts are not
perfectly reliable. Ship captains have to make
policy decisions on what courses to set, taking
into account the forecasts and what is known
about forecast accuracy. Economic policymakers
have to make the same sorts of decisions based
on incomplete knowledge.
P
eople often ask me questions about
the Fed, sometimes out of simple
curiosity and sometimes out of a real
need to know for business reasons.
Portfolio managers, for example, have a real need
to know. My remarks reflect my effort to provide
rather systematically some answers to common
questions. And I will also answer questions that
ought to be put to me, but usually are not. There
is no reason why the Federal Reserve should be
a mysterious organization—we ought to be
responsive to your concerns.
Obviously, I want to emphasize that the views
I express here are mine and do not necessarily
reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve
System. I suspect that each of us involved in
Federal Reserve policy would answer the ques-
tions somewhat differently and emphasize differ-
ent things. In any event, I’ll offer my answers. I
thank my colleagues at the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis for their comments, especially Robert H.
Rasche, senior vice president and director of
research, who provided special assistance.
THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC
SCIENCE IN MONETARY POLICY
A very general question concerns the basis on
which policy decisions are made. It is important
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about how policy decisions affect the economy,
the central bank can in principle specify a policy
rule, or response function, that guides policy. To
achieve a good result, the general public and mar-
ket participants need to understand the objectives
and the response function so that the private
economy can determine its activities with full
knowledge of how the central bank will act. Of
course, uncertainty is an inherent characteristic
of the economic world. What should be predict-
able are the central bank’s responses to the never-
ending sequence of surprises that characterize
the economic environment.
Monetary Policy Objectives
Congress sets the mission of the Federal
Reserve in the conduct of monetary policy. Origin-
ally, the Fed’s mission was specified in the Federal
Reserve Act signed into law by President Woodrow
Wilson in December 1913. The Fed’s current man-
date, set formally in an amendment to the Federal
Reserve Act in 1977 and reaffirmed in 2000,
requires the Federal Reserve to pursue three objec-
tives through its conduct of monetary policy. They
are “maximum employment, stable prices and
moderate long-term interest rates” (Bernanke,
2006a). Economists recognize that long-term
interest rates incorporate a premium for expected
inflation. Thus, the objectives of price stability
and low long-term interest rates are essentially
the same objective.
This “dual mandate,” so-called because of its
emphasis on both employment and price stability
objectives, differs from that of other central banks,
especially the “inflation targeting” central banks.
Inflation targeters, including the Bank of Canada,
the Bank of England, and the Reserve Bank of
New Zealand, among others, operate under an
agreement with their respective governments that
defines price stability as the single objective and
specifies a quantitative definition of the inflation
objective. In a similar fashion, the European
Central Bank (ECB) is given a price stability man-
date under the Maastricht Treaty, though the treaty
does not give a numeric value or range to the ECB.
The ECB has interpreted its mandate as prevent-
ing the inflation rate from exceeding 2 percent
per annum over a “medium term” horizon.
Today, there is general agreement among
professional economists and central bankers
around the world that, in the long run, monetary
policy cannot achieve a tradeoff between inflation
and employment. Successive Fed chairmen have
emphasized that price stability is not only a man-
dated objective of monetary policy but also the
means by which monetary policy contributes to
achieving the other two objectives. The view goes
back at least to Chairman William McChesney
Martin: “My interest in a monetary policy directed
toward a dollar of stable value is not based on the
feeling that price stability is a more important
national objective than either maximum sustain-
able growth or a high level of employment, but
rather on the reasoned conclusion that the objec-
tive of price stability is an essential prerequisite
for their achievement” (McChesney Martin, 1959,
p. 5). In his 1979 confirmation hearing, Chairman
Paul Volcker (U.S. Congress, 1979) made this state-
ment: “I believe that ultimately the only sound
foundation for continuing growth and prosperity
of the American economy is much greater price
stability.” Early in his tenure, Chairman Alan
Greenspan (1988) concurred in this view: “The
Committee continued to focus on maintaining
the economic expansion and on progress toward
price stability, which was seen as a necessary con-
dition for long-term sustained economic growth.”
In July 2006, Chairman Ben S. Bernanke (2006b)
acknowledged the following: “The achievement
of price stability is one of the objectives that make
up the Congress’s mandate to the Federal Reserve.
Moreover, in the long run, price stability is critical
to achieving maximum employment and moder-
ate long-term interest rates, the other parts of the
congressional mandate.”
I believe that we can go a step beyond these
statements. In my view, the goal of price stability
must be the primary goal for three reasons. First,
in the long run, employment and economic growth
are maximized in an environment of price stability.
Second, only in an environment of price stability
and market confidence that the central bank will
continue to maintain price stability will the central
bank be in a position to act deliberately to offset
Poole
4 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2007 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEWmany types of disturbances that would otherwise
create fluctuations in employment and output.
The Federal Reserve does not have the power to
completely offset all such disturbances, but it
can cushion their effects and thereby improve
economic stability. Finally, price stability is a
goal in its own right simply because price insta-
bility creates arbitrary and unfair redistributions
of income and wealth.
I have often noted that my own personal
preference is to define “price stability” as a con-
dition in which the rate of inflation, properly
measured, is on average zero. I insert the qualifier
“properly measured” to point out that actual price
indices may have statistical problems such that
zero measured inflation on a particular price index
might not in fact reflect a true state of zero infla-
tion. Although my own preference is for zero infla-
tion properly measured, I believe that a central
bank consensus on some other numerical goal of
reasonably low inflation is more important than
the exact number chosen. Thus, I find that recent
discussion of a “comfort zone” of 1 to 2 percent
inflation measured by the price index for personal
consumption expenditures (PCE), excluding the
volatile food and energy components, is perfectly
consistent with my own thinking.
Note that the congressional mandate to the
Federal Reserve does not include any of numerous
objectives that from time to time have been advo-
cated by supporters of various interests: for exam-
ple, stable exchange rates, stable asset prices, or
housing investment. Clarity of objectives is an
important attribute of monetary policy today and
contributes greatly to its success.
Systematic Policy
The dual nature of the Fed mandate is well
summarized in the “Taylor rule.” In 1993, Stanford
economist John Taylor proposed a simple formula
relating the federal funds rate to (i) a long-run
inflation target and (ii) short-run deviations of
inflation from that target and short-run deviations
of real gross domestic product (GDP) (Taylor, 1993)
from a measure of “potential real GDP.”1 Taylor
suggested that his simple relationship character-
ized in broad outline the actual behavior of the
federal funds rate in the early years of the
Greenspan FOMC. The essence of this relationship
is that, in the long-run, the FOMC seeks to keep
the federal funds rate roughly consistent with a
level that is believed to produce a target level of
inflation. Taylor assumed a target rate of inflation
of 2 percent per year measured by the total con-
sumer price index (CPI). In the short run, the
relationship implies that the FOMC adjusts the
target federal funds rate up as either the observed
inflation rate exceeds the target level of inflation or
real GDP exceeds potential real GDP. Conversely,
under the Taylor rule, the FOMC reduces the target
federal funds rate when inflation falls below its
target and/or real GDP falls short of potential real
GDP. Thus the relationship incorporates the pri-
macy of a long-run inflation objective while incor-
porating short-run stabilization efforts.
Figure 1 shows the actual value of the federal
funds rate target on FOMC meeting dates starting
in 1987 as well as a computed value based on
Taylor’s original formula and the information
available to the FOMC at the time of each meet-
ing.2 The inflation rate in the figure is the total
CPI. Through 2000, the gap between real GDP
and potential real GDP is the value measured by
the staff of the Board of Governors at the time of
each FOMC meeting.
After 2000, the staff assumptions about the
GDP gap are not yet publicly available, so the
dotted line in the graph for this period is com-
puted with the GDP gap as constructed by the
Congressional Budget Office. Also beginning in
2000, the FOMC changed its inflation objective
in two ways. First, the Committee emphasized
the inflation rate as measured by changes in the
PCE inflation rate rather than the CPI inflation
rate. Second, the Committee emphasized the core
PCE index, which excludes the volatile food and
energy components. Hence, it is likely that after
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1 Taylor compared the values of his formula against the observed
history of the funds rate from 1987 through 1992.
2 In the figure, the Taylor formula is evaluated on the basis of “real
time” information that could have been used in reaching a policy
decision. Since May 17, 1989, all changes in the intended funds
rate have been 25 basis points or multiples thereof. Since April
18, 1994, all changes in the intended funds rate have been voted
on by the FOMC either at a regularly scheduled meeting or on an
intermeeting conference call.2000 the Taylor formula does not accurately reflect
the information used by the FOMC as input to its
deliberations.
Note that the target funds rate predicted by
the Taylor formula generally tracks the actual
funds rate through 2000, though there are sizable
and persistent deviations of the funds rate from
the values predicted by the formula. Nevertheless
several of these episodes are consistent with a
systematic monetary policy. First, in 1989, the
FOMC increased the target funds rate more quickly
than predicted by the formula, suggesting that the
Committee responded more vigorously to rising
inflation than incorporated in the Taylor specifica-
tion. Second, during 1990-91, the FOMC reduced
the funds rate more quickly than predicted by the
formula, suggesting a stronger response to the
recession than incorporated in the Taylor speci-
fication. Third, between late September 1992 and
February 1994, the target funds rate was held at
a lower level (3 percent) than predicted by the
Taylor specification. It was during this period that
the FOMC expressed concern about “financial
headwinds” that were restraining the recovery
from the 1990-91 recession. Finally, in the fall of
1998, the FOMC lowered the funds rate when the
Taylor specification predicted that the rate would
be held constant. At this time, concern about
financial stability figured strongly in policy delib-
erations in the wake of the Asian financial crisis,
the Russian Default, and the collapse of Long-Term
Capital Management (LTCM).
The FOMC, and certainly John Taylor himself,
view the Taylor rule as a general guideline. Depar-
tures from the rule make good sense when infor-
mation beyond that incorporated in the rule is
available. For example, policy is forward looking,
which means that from time to time the economic
outlook changes sufficiently that it makes sense
for the FOMC to set a funds rate target either above
or below the level called for in the Taylor rule,
which relies on observed recent data rather than
on economic forecasts of future data. Other cir-
cumstances—an obvious example is September 11,
2001—call for a policy response. These responses
can be and generally are understood by the market.
Thus, such responses can be every bit as system-
atic as the responses specified in the Taylor rule.
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A critical ingredient in the Taylor specification
as a description of monetary policy is the long-
run target rate of inflation. In practice, financial
market participants and the public in general
cannot adequately understand the Fed’s monetary
policy—that is, the strategic thinking that guides
the sequence of individual policy actions—with-
out a good understanding of what the FOMC con-
siders to be an acceptable long-run average rate
of inflation. When monetary policymakers artic-
ulate their goal for long-run inflation and pursue
credible policies to achieve that goal, they provide
the basis for “anchoring” the inflation expectations
that guide consumption behavior of households
and investment decisions of firms. Inflation expec-
tations also determine the inflation premiums in
nominal interest rates that are required to equili-
brate financial markets.
Evidence suggests, particularly in the U.S.
economy, that the actual inflation experience is
driven by inflation expectations, resource utiliza-
tion—usually measured by a gap term as in the
Taylor rule—and “supply shocks” such as changes
in the world market prices of energy and other
commodities. Of these, the most significant factor
historically has been the influence of inflation
expectations. Hence, when the anchor for infla-
tion expectations begins to drag, actual inflation
becomes volatile, and the resulting distortions to
economic activity and conditions in financial
markets produce significant disruptions in the
economy. The most recent severe example from
our economic history of inflation expectations
getting out of control occurred in 1977-79.
It is a terrible thing if monetary policymakers
lose their credibility that they will maintain low
and stable long-run inflation. Once credibility is
impaired, it can only be re-established the “old
fashioned way”—policymakers have to earn it!
Restoring credibility takes time in the face of sub-
stantial persistence in the actual inflation process.
It took well over a decade to completely restore
low inflation in the United States after the Great
Inflation of the 1970s, and in the process the
economy experienced the worst recession, in
1981-82, since the Great Depression.
INTERPRETING NEW
INFORMATION
Financial market participants form expecta-
tions with respect to the prospective state of the
economy from evidence of the current state of the
economy as indicated in regular data releases,
and other activities, such as political events and
policy actions that influence economic activity
and market prices. The evidence for such forward-
looking expectations is widespread. Futures con-
tracts in commodities, interest rates, and foreign
exchange are actively traded in large volume on
organized exchanges. Surveys of forecasts of
forthcoming data releases appear regularly (e.g.,
The Ticker, which appears every Monday in the
Wall Street Journal, and the Calendar of Releases,
which appears each Friday on the cover page of
U.S. Financial Data published by the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis).3 Prices in financial
markets respond to differences between the
observed information on the economic situation
and the expectations about such information—
that is, markets respond to “news.”
There are many claims but no convincing
documented evidence of lagged responses to
“news.” Economic theory suggests that market
prices of assets should behave like random
walks—that the accumulated information at a
point in time should have no predictive power
for future changes in prices. Put another way, new
information is quickly reflected in market prices,
leaving no remaining predictable change in market
prices that would permit an investor to expect
an above-normal return from buying or selling
the asset.
A huge body of empirical research is broadly
consistent with this hypothesis. Thus, market
commentary that today’s market adjustments are
caused by, or due to, continuing concerns over
implications of old information are of doubtful
validity. Traders, financial journalists, and eco-
nomic pundits seem to believe that they have to
attribute market adjustments to something, even
when there is no evidence to support the asserted
reasons.
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3 The latter data are from a survey conducted by Thomson Financial.An analyst who is presumed to be an expert
ought often to say that price changes appear inex-
plicable or random. But few experts in fact say
such a thing. Therefore, I recommend that the
wary observer be skeptical about purported expla-
nations for price changes and should always
check an explanation against behavior in other
markets. In my experience, explanations for stock
market fluctuations are especially suspect. In
recent years, I have often read claims that the
stock market went down because of interest rate
fears, only to find that interest rates in the bond
market were unchanged or went down instead of
up. Given that so many institutions deal in both
the equity and bond markets, it makes absolutely
no sense that interest rate fears could drive down
stock prices and have no effect on interest rates.
Clearly, Federal Reserve policy adjustments
and market expectations about future policy
adjustments do explain some stock market fluctu-
ations. I accept that fact. Indeed, the transmission
mechanism linking monetary policy decisions to
changes in the inflation rate and employment
require such effects. But, I really don’t want to be
held responsible for stock market fluctuations
that occurred for other reasons or are simply
inexplicable! So, next time you read that the stock
market went down because of “interest rate fears,”
please do take a quick look at the bond tables to
see if interest rates actually changed that day.4
New information drives both market adjust-
ments and policy changes. Policy decisions ordi-
4 Those who report on the stock market do not confine their mis-
leading causal statements to the Fed. In mid-August 2006, the
Dow Jones average closed down over 90 points, attributed by at
least one report to “oil price fears.” Looking at trading in the oil
markets, September oil futures on the NYMEX exchange closed
up only 4 cents, but October futures closed down 19 cents.
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Figure 2
Actual and Predicted Changes in Eurodollar Yields, 3-Month Horizonnarily cannot be set long in advance because the
FOMC must be open to changing its policy stance
in response to new information, which is inher-
ently unpredictable. To gain a sense of the impact
of new information on interest rates, I’ll analyze
data from the eurodollar futures market. Eurodollar
deposits are not federal funds, though changes
in the two yields are highly correlated. To study
market expectations about the federal funds rate
over horizons of four or more months, it is best
to use eurodollar futures because these contracts
are actively traded over far future horizons,
whereas trading of federal funds futures is rela-
tively thin on horizons of more than a few months.
Prices in the eurodollar futures market pro-
vide direct information on market expectations
of future FOMC policy actions setting the target
federal funds rate. Consider the forecasting record
on three-month and six-month horizons. Figure 2
focuses on the difference between the yield on a
three-month eurodollar futures contract with three
months to maturity and the actual eurodollar
deposit yield. This difference is plotted on the
horizontal axis against the actual change in the
yield on eurodollar deposits over the correspond-
ing three months to the maturity date on the ver-
tical axis. Thus, the three-month actual change
in the eurodollar deposit rate is plotted against
the forecasted change in the eurodollar deposit
yield over the same time period. The observations
are taken every three months starting in December
1994.5 The same exercise is repeated at a six-
month horizon in Figure 3.
In each of the two graphs, the diagonal line
from the lower left to the upper right represents a
line of perfect forecasts—if all the points lay along
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5 Hence, the observations are nonoverlapping.
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Figure 3
Actual and Predicted Changes in Eurodollar Yields, 6-Month Horizonthis line, the eurodollar futures market would
never have made any errors in forecasting the
change in the eurodollar yield over the succeed-
ing three (six) months. It is evident from the figures
that the futures markets fall short of such perfec-
tion. In fact, over the entire period, the correlation
between the forecast changes and the actual
changes on a three-month horizon is only 0.65; on
the six-month horizon the correlation falls to 0.54.
As an aside, note that economists and statisti-
cians usually measure forecasting accuracy by the
square of the correlation coefficient, or R2. Thus,
a correlation of 0.65 is an R2 of 0.42, which means
that the forecasts embedded in the eurodollar
futures market explain 42 percent of the variance
of fluctuations in the actual eurodollar yield. Thus,
unpredictable events even over a three-month
horizon are responsible for more than half of the
variance of the eurodollar yield. Over a six-month
horizon, the R2 is 0.29, which means that unpre-
dictable events are responsible for more than 70
percent of the variance over a six-month horizon.
The overall correlations mask some interesting
details. The points plotted in black in each figure
represent observations since the middle of 2003,
when the FOMC started providing “forward
guidance” regarding future policy actions. Note
that these points scatter fairly tightly around the
line of perfect forecasts—markets were not partic-
ularly surprised by the evolution of policy actions
over this period. In contrast, consider the forecasts
for the first half of 1995. The three-month and
six-month futures market forecasts in December
1994 were for large positive changes in the euro-
dollar deposit rate over the succeeding three and
six months. In the event, the eurodollar deposit
rate fell a bit over these horizons. The December
1994 futures prices were observed shortly after
the FOMC increased the funds rate target by 75
basis points in November 1994, and the market
had expected further substantial increases. In fact,
the FOMC increased the funds rate target by only
50 basis points in the first half of 1995 (at the
January FOMC meeting).
Another large miss occurred in December
2000. At that time, the futures market forecasts
were for a decline in the eurodollar yield of 35
basis points over the following three months and
a total of 67 basis points over the six-month
period. Instead, the FOMC acted aggressively to
lower the funds rate target starting in January and
continuing through May 2001 by a total of 250
basis points. The FOMC acted aggressively as
incoming information pointed to growing weak-
ness in economic activity. Both the FOMC and the
markets were surprised by incoming information
indicating that the economy was weakening
quickly and significantly.
It is rare that a single data report is decisive
for the FOMC. The economic outlook is deter-
mined by numerous pieces of information. Impor-
tant data such as the inflation and the employment
reports are cross-checked against other informa-
tion. The FOMC is aware of the possibility of data
revisions and short-run anomalies.
My key point is that market commentary
indicating that the FOMC is unpredictable is off
base. Typically, the FOMC cannot be predictable
because new information driving policy adjust-
ments is not predictable. All of us would like to
be able to predict the future. We in the Fed do the
best we can, but the markets should not complain
that the FOMC lacks clairvoyance! What the
FOMC strives to do is to respond systematically
to the new information. There is considerable
evidence that the market does successfully predict
FOMC responses to the available information at
the time of regularly scheduled meetings.6
FOMC PROCESSES
The Board of Governors and the Reserve Banks
are fortunate to have highly professional, nonpo-
litical staffs of economists. The role of the staff is
to provide analysis of current economic condi-
tions, forecasts of the evolution of the economy
over a horizon of a couple of years, and assess-
ments of the risks to those forecasts. Such infor-
mation is a valuable and valued input into policy
discussions. I myself do not finally make up my
mind on a policy position until I’ve heard both
staff presentations and the views of other FOMC
participants. More accurately, I go into each FOMC
6 See, for example, Poole (2005).
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action given my assessment of the economic out-
look, but I try to be as open as I can to having my
view altered by discussion at the FOMC meeting.
There are certainly instances when I have changed
the view I took into the meeting as a consequence
of the discussion.
Distinction Between Members and
Participants
Except when there are vacancies in offices,
there are 19 principals, or participants, at each
FOMC meeting—the 7 members of the Board of
Governors and the 12 Reserve Bank presidents.
All of these participants are fully engaged in pre-
senting their views. They bring information from
their business and academic contacts, comment
on staff presentations, discuss analytical issues
relevant to understanding the economy and policy
issues, and present their views as to the most
appropriate policy action. However, at any partic-
ular meeting there are only 12 voting members
of the Committee. Each of the 7 members of the
Board of Governors is a permanent member of
the FOMC. The president of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York is also a permanent member.
The remaining Federal Reserve Bank presidents
rotate as members of the FOMC. As president of
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, I am in a
rotation group with the presidents of the Federal
Reserve Banks of Atlanta and Dallas. This struc-
ture of the FOMC dates from 1942. In the early
years of the FOMC, not all the principals were
allowed to participate, or even attend, meetings
at which they were not voting members of the
Committee.
The purpose of FOMC meetings is to reach a
consensus among the participants and, particu-
larly, among the members about the appropriate
policy action (setting of the funds rate target) given
policy goals and the outlook for the economy.
Unanimous decisions, while desirable, are not
required, and members are free to dissent from
the consensus view if they feel strongly that an
alternative policy action is preferable. Indeed, I
believe that it is my obligation under the Federal
Reserve Act to dissent when I believe strongly
that an alternative policy course would be better.
Historically, dissents were not unusual; though,
in the recent years, they have been relatively rare.
Communication
Once policy action has been set, it is abso-
lutely necessary that communication to the public
about the policy action not be garbled. Hence,
the Chairman is the only participant who speaks
officially for the Committee. He presents official
Federal Reserve positions through testimony
before congressional committees and in public
speeches. The minutes of FOMC meetings, cur-
rently released three weeks after each meeting, also
represent the official position of the Committee.
Participants other than the Chairman express
their own views in speeches. These speeches often
may seem to reflect a “party line” but are rarely
centrally coordinated in any way. In my experi-
ence, the only time there has been a real effort to
coordinate public comments by the participants
was in the late summer of 1998. At that time,
financial markets were skittish as a result of the
Russian default and financial troubles of LTCM.
I recall an informal gathering in the late summer
of 1998 with Chairman Greenspan and a couple
of other FOMC members when the Chairman made
a request that we say very little given the rather
tense state of the markets as the LTCM situation
unfolded.
Seeming coordination at other times is a con-
sequence of the fact that FOMC participants
ordinarily see things quite similarly. But most
participants are not shy about expressing their
differences. Differences are registered in a formal
way through discount rate decisions of the Reserve
Banks and informally through positions stated
in speeches. Anyone can obtain an excellent feel
for what goes on at an FOMC meeting by reading
transcripts that are released with a lag of five years
and are made available on the website of the
Board of Governors.
Dealing with the Press
Different FOMC participants have different
attitudes and comfort levels in dealing with the
press. I myself give many speeches and almost
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I try to be as clear as I can, but from time to time
I realize after the fact that I have not expressed
myself as clearly as I would have liked. When
reading press accounts, be aware that FOMC mem-
bers misspeak from time to time and press inter-
pretations are not always as intended. We all try
to be as careful as possible but are not infallible.
Be wary of headlines. Reporters will tell you that
they are sometimes frustrated with the headlines
that appear over their stories. Be aware also that
wire service reports are sometimes designed to
move markets. Considerations behind policy
adjustments are often complex—be cautious
about simple interpretations.
I believe that one of my responsibilities is to
communicate to a wider audience through the
press, doing the best I can to be accurate and to
convey both policy fundamentals and policy
nuances. A well-informed public is essential to
an effective monetary policy. In my experience,
press reports are generally, but not always, accu-
rate. The financial journalists with whom I interact
are genuinely interested in getting the story right.
They do ask probing questions, as they should,
but do not try to impose their own personal slant
to the reports they publish. Inaccuracies are gen-
erally a consequence of the complexity of the sub-
ject and the need, on my part and the journalists’
part, to make reports simple enough for a wide
audience to understand.
When talking with the press, one of the points
I try to convey is that I do not come to a firm con-
clusion about my policy position until just before
the FOMC meeting; as I have said, even then, I
do my best to maintain an open mind, which can
be changed by the staff presentation and general
discussion at the meeting itself. I have already
documented the most important reason for this
policy of mine. Inherently unpredictable informa-
tion can arrive right up to the day of the meeting.
It would not be sound practice for policymakers
to lock themselves into decisions impervious to
new information.
Another reason why I ordinarily do not have
a settled policy position weeks before an FOMC
meeting is this: I follow economic reports con-
tinuously between FOMC meetings, but do not
ordinarily dig deeply into them until the period
of intense preparation the week before an FOMC
meeting. Thus, my views on incoming information
are often tentative and incomplete; I know that
I’ll be reviewing all available information in the
intense preparation period. I believe that it would
not be helpful to the markets for me to convey
views that I know are tentative and incomplete;
thus, I try not to speculate about the significance
of new information for the policy decision to be
debated at the next FOMC meeting. My responsi-
bility is to convey accurate information and,
equally, not to be a source of misleading or inac-
curate interpretations of incoming information.
Bottom Line
The Federal Reserve has the responsibility to
provide leadership. The ideal situation is when
the market can reasonably predict what the Fed
is going to do because the Fed has provided the
leadership to make clear its objectives and how
it pursues those objectives. The Fed is not and
ought not to be viewed as an adversary of the
markets. Policy actions and statements do have
market effects. Those are unavoidable, but the Fed
strives to make policy as clear as it can so that
what is really surprising the markets is not Fed
actions but the arrival of new information that
surprises the Fed and markets together.
I’ve tried to answer questions that are com-
monly put to me and to provide a general frame-
work for better understanding of the Federal
Reserve. And I hope that I have provoked some
additional questions.
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